R. v. Bingley 2017 SCC 12 – after Bingley was observed driving erratically, the police were called. One of the officers, a certified drug recognition expert (DRE) under the Criminal Code, conducted a standard field sobriety test. Bingley failed the test and was arrested for driving while impaired by a drug. At trial, the prosecution called the DRE to explain the results of his drug recognition evaluation as evidence of Bingley’s impairment. The prosecution relied on s. 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code as establishing the admissibility of the DRE’s testimony and argued that no voir dire was required. The judge at the first trial allowed the DRE to testify as an expert regarding the results of the drug recognition evaluation without a voir dire, but acquitted Bingley. On appeal, the acquittal was overturned and a new trial ordered. The second trial judge held that the DRE could not be qualified as an expert because he was not trained in the science underlying the drug recognition procedure. He also concluded that the evidence was not admissible lay opinion. He acquitted Bingley. The prosecution successfully appealed the second acquittal. The summary conviction appeal judge held that s. 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code rendered a DRE’s opinion automatically admissible and that in any event, it would be admissible lay opinion. The Court of Appeal held that the DRE’s opinion evidence was admissible without a voir dire. Section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code allowed a DRE “to determine” whether an individual was impaired due to a drug or a combination of drugs and alcohol. It was implicit that this determination was automatically admissible as opinion evidence, the Court opined. Bingley appealed to the SCC.
The SCC, in a majority decision, ruled that drug recognition experts (DREs) under s. 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code can testify without an expert evidence voir dire as the underlying science has been presumed established by Parliament:
The majority, at para. 12, ruled that:
“The purpose of s. 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code confirmed that a DRE’s opinion was not automatically admissible at trial. Section 254(3.1) gave the police investigative tools to enforce laws against drug-impaired driving. It did not dictate whether evidence obtained through the use of those investigative tools would be admissible at trial. When Parliament intended to make evidence automatically admissible, it said so expressly. As s. 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code did not speak to admissibility, the common law rules of evidence applied.”
At para. 14:
“Expert evidence analysis was divided into two stages. First, the evidence had to meet the four Mohan factors: (1) relevance, (2) necessity, (3) absence of an exclusionary rule, and (4) special expertise. Second, the trial judge was required to weigh potential risks against the benefits of admitting the evidence.”
The SCC said the only issue in this case was whether the DRE had special expertise as required by the fourth Mohan factor. Bingley conceded that the proposed evidence was logically relevant, necessary, and not subject to any other exclusionary rule. Further, Bingley did not argue that the evidence should be excluded because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.
Knowledge of the underlying science was not a precondition to the admissibility of a DRE’s opinion, said the SCC. The basic requirement of expertise for an expert witness was that the witness had expertise outside the experience and knowledge of the trier of fact, which the DRE in this case did. DREs received special training in how to administer the 12-step drug recognition evaluation and in what inferences could be drawn from the factual data they noted. It followed that the DRE’s evidence was admissible in this case.
Where it was clear that all the requirements of a common law rule of admissibility were established, the trial judge was not obliged to hold a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the evidence. The trial judge correctly found that the DRE in this case was an expert for purposes of administering the 12-step evaluation and determining whether Bingley was driving while impaired for the purpose of requiring further testing. He erred, however, said the SCC, in concluding that because the officer was not an expert in the scientific foundation of the various elements of the test, none of his opinion evidence was admissible.
At para. 26:
“…Reliability is not assessed in a vacuum. Parliament has established, through the adoption of the Regulations, that the 12-step drug evaluation is sufficiently reliable for the purpose of a DRE’s determination of impairment under s. 254(3.1). The scope of a DRE’s expertise is limited to that determination, and it is only for the purpose of making that determination that Parliament has established the 12-step drug evaluation’s reliability.”
At para. 27:
“… He is thus an expert for the purpose of applying the 12-step evaluation and determining whether that evaluation indicates drug impairment for the purposes of s. 254(3.1). His expertise has been conclusively and irrebuttably established by Parliament.”
At para. 30:
“… Limitations, such as the absence of a standardized approach to weighing the various tests in reaching a determination, may affect the probative value of a DRE’s opinion evidence. A DRE may be unable to explain how he or she made the determination based on the application of the 12-step evaluation. If the probative value of an individual DRE’s evidence is so diminished that the benefits in admitting the evidence are outweighed by the potential harm to the trial process, a trial judge retains the discretion to exclude that evidence. I reiterate here that the focus of the analysis must be on the DRE’s administration of the evaluation, not on the reliability of the steps underlying the evaluation, which have been prescribed by Parliament.”
At para. 31:
“It is also important to note that the determination of the DRE is not conclusive of the ultimate question of whether the accused was driving while impaired by a drug. The DRE’s task is to determine whether the evaluation indicates drug impairment. The DRE’s evidence does not presume the ultimate issue of guilt; it is merely one piece of the picture for the judge or jury to consider.”
And, finally, at para. 32:
“That Parliament has established the reliability of the 12-step drug evaluation by statute does not hinder the trier of fact’s ability to critically assess a DRE’s conclusion of impairment or an accused person’s right to test that evidence. Cross-examination of the DRE may undermine his or her conclusion. Evidence of bias may raise doubt about the officer’s conclusion. The officer may fail to conduct the drug recognition evaluation in accordance with his or her training. A DRE may draw questionable inferences from his or her observations. Bodily sample evidence obtained under s. 254(3.4) may refute the DRE’s assessment, as may evidence of bystanders or other experts. It will always be for the trier of fact to determine what weight to give a DRE’s opinion. Any weight given to a DRE’s evidence will necessarily respect the scope of the DRE’s expertise and the fact that it is not conclusive of impairment.”